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Abstract: This paper deals with the safety of the level crossing control system. We
propose one way of the safety evaluation witch consist on the extraction of feared
scenarios in the Petri net model of the system. We use ESA_PetriNet tool (Extraction
Scenarios & Analyzer by Petri Net model) that was developed in the aim of extraction
of feared scenarios in computer-controlled systems. These scenarios characterize the
sequences of actions leading to dangerous situations. The taking into account of the
failures, the temporal constraints and partially the continuous dynamic (by temporal
abstraction) of the system makes it possible to respect the order of appearance of the
events in the generated scenarios.
Keywords: Critical scenarios, hybrid dynamic, level crossing control system, safety,
temporal Petri net
1 Introduction
One way to evaluate the safety [2] of complex system such as a level crossing control system (lccs)
is the extraction of critical scenarios leading to the feared states. A qualitative analysis method of safety,
aiming the extraction of all the critical scenarios from a Petri Net model [5] of computer-controlled
systems was developed by [3]. This approach witch is an extension of a method developed by [6] but
which operated only on the discrete aspect of the system, takes into account the continuous aspect of
the system and the temporal specifications. This approach based on linear logic [7] determines more
precisely the exact conditions of the occurrence of the feared event, i.e what has led the system to leave
its normal operation and to evolve into the feared state. The originality of this approach is that the order
of occurrence of the events is taken into account, and impossible scenarios with respect to continuous
dynamics and temporal specifications of the system are eliminated. The automation of all stages of the
process has led to the development of ESA_PetriNet tool (Extraction & Scenarios Analyser by PetriNet
model) [4] that has been interfaced with TINA tool (Time Petri Net Analyzer) [8].We will use in this
paper ESA_PetriNet tool to extract dangerous scenarios from the level crossing benchmark published by
[10].
We will present the method of extraction of feared scenarios and the basic of the algorithm in sec-
tion 2, the level crossing control system in section 3, its Petri Net modelling in section 4, the use of
ESA_PetriNet tool to generate the critical scenarios in the section 5 and we will end by a conclusion.
2 Method of extraction of feared scenarios
The application of this method requires the modelling of the system by a time Petri Net model and
identifying the places of nominal behaviour. The appropriate Petri net modelling of computer-controlled
systems is a Predicate Transitions Differential Stochastic Petri net (PTDS Petri net) as they are generally
hybrid (discrete and continuous dynamics) and there safety analysis require taking into account failures.
A temporal abstraction is necessary to translate this model to a time Petri net by associating to the
transitions a temporal interval of firing corresponding to the time which the system can spend to reach
the state in question. A preliminary analysis will refine fields of variables according to various accessible
markings by reasoning on the invariants of places. Indeed, the invariants of places determine the possible
dynamics, and which other places can be simultaneously marked when a token is present in a given place.
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2.1 Principal
The method of extraction of feared scenarios is made up of two steps [3]: a backward reasoning and
a forward reasoning. The backward reasoning takes as an initial marking in the reversed Petri net model
(the initial Petri net in which all the arcs are reversed), the only target state (feared) and seeks exhaustively
all the scenarios making it possible to consume the initial marking (feared state since forward reasoning)
and reach a final marking composed only of places associated to the normal operation. The forward
reasoning takes as an initial state these places of normal operation in the initial Petri net model. The
objective is to locate the junctions between the feared behaviour and the normal operation of the system
as well as the conditions implied in these junctions. Thus we have not only the explanation of the
dangerous behaviour but also of strategies allowing its avoidance. A significant point of the method is
that the context in which occurred the feared event is enriched gradually. The enrichment (of marking)
consists on putting tokens in empty places in the Petri net model when it is necessary to make evolve
the system and generate scenarios. The invariant of places are used as a mechanism of checking the
coherence of the enrichment of marking. Indeed the new tokens added are removed if they do not respect
the dynamics of the system.
Each scenario is given in form of a partial order between the events necessary to the appearance of
the feared event what differs from a failure tree, which gives a whole of static combinations of the partial
states necessary for obtaining the feared state.
2.2 Dealing with continuous dynamics by temporal abstraction
This method takes into account the conditions associated to the firing of certain transitions. These
conditions are thresholds involving continuous variables. By temporal approximation of the hybrid dy-
namics, these thresholds are transformed to durations, which correspond to time that the system puts to
reach when the transitions are enabled. From a qualitative point of view, the objective is to determine
the firing order of the transition. Thus, when we enrich the marking, we can find situation where two
transitions t1 and t2 are enabled if only the ordinary Petri net is considered, but whose are such as t1 will
be always fired before t2 if the temporal abstraction is also considered. In the generation of the scenarios
only the firing of t1 will be considered since that of t2 before t1 would be in fact incoherent with the
continuous dynamics. This appears in the form of a priority: if t1 and t2 are enabled, only the case of t1,
priority, is examined. The taking into account of these precedence relations coming from the continuous
dynamics and not specified by the ordinary Petri net allows to reduce the number of scenarios generated
by eliminating a certain number of incoherent scenarios with respect to continuous dynamics.
Let us consider an example. In Figure 1 we suppose that the differential-algebra system associated
to the place P1 guarantees that the variable x is increasing. We associate to the transition t1 the threshold
x = v1 and to the transition t2 the threshold x = v2 with v1 < v2. Finally, we suppose that when the token
arrives in the place P1 we have always x < v1. So, if the place P3 is marked, the transition t1 will be fired
before t2 since the threshold associated to t1 is lower than that of t2. In this case we don’t consider the
scenario associated to the firing of t2. On the other hand, if t3 is already fired for example if we consider
that t1 is a stochastic transition corresponding to a failure (place P3 empty) and if the place P2 is marked,
t1 cannot be fired and then t2 will be fired.
In the example above, finally only one type of scenarios is examined, those for which the transition t2
is fired after t3. So, there is a precedence relation between the firing of t3, which empties the place P3 and
that of t2, however there is no place connecting t3 to t2. This precedence relation is so, a consequence of
continuous dynamics and thresholds associated to transitions t1 and t2. We are talking in this case about
indirect precedence relation and about indirect causality. The direct precedence relations and causality
are those that are highlighted by the only Petri net, i.e. by the only discrete aspect.
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Figure 1: Temporal abstraction and priority due to thresholds of transitions
2.3 ESA_PetriNet tool
ESA_PetriNet tool uses two output files of TINA tool as input files. The first file is a textual descrip-
tion of the Petri net model of the system and the second contains the invariant of places. The indirect
precedence between certain transitions firing resulted by the temporal abstraction of continuous dynam-
ics, is expressed in the algorithm in the form of rules of priority (a certain transition is not fired if another
is enabled). The transition time interval of TINA tool permits to express this rule of priority. If we take
the example of Figure 1, if there is an intersection between the time interval associated to transitions
t1 and t2, they will have the same priority of firing and the two scenarios will be generated. We note
that only one execution of the algorithm generates automatically several scenarios. All the possible and
coherent scenarios with respect to the continuous dynamics and the temporal constraints of the system
are generated.
3 Level crossing control system case study
Figure 2: Railway level crossing
3.1 General description
This case study concerns a decentralized radio-based railway level crossing control system taken
from a realistic specification of a new radio-based train control system, which has been developed for the
German Railways. It is presented by [10] and studied by [9] using a transformation of a p-time Petri net
model of the system to automata in the purpose of avoiding forbidden states. This modelling is of a high
level of abstraction and does not take into account the failures of the system.
Although, simplification has been made in the presentation of this example, it remain especially
interesting as it is well known by the railway specialists, takes into account software and hardware
specification, hybrid dynamic and temporal constraints. Our aim is a whole modelling of the system
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using a Petri nets model by taking into accounts the hybrid dynamic, temporal constraints and failures.
Then, applying the method described above to extract critical scenarios.
3.2 Composition of the system and specification
The radio-based level crossing control system is used in an intersection area between a single track
railway line and a road as illustrated in Figure 2a. To avoid collision, trains and road traffic must
not enter at the same time this crossing zone called danger zone. The level crossing is controlled by
means of signals radio communication between a train-borne control system (on-board system), a level
crossing control system and an operation centre which supervises interactions between the two preceding
components. It is important to note that transmission times on the network may vary and radio telegrams
may be lost.
The railway crossing is equipped with half barriers, a red and a yellow road traffic light. Road users
shall stop at the level crossing if possible when the yellow light is shown and must stop when the red
light is shown as the level crossing is closed for road users in this case. The yellow light and the red light
never must be shown together and when both are off the danger zone can be crossed by road users. The
traffic lights and barriers at the level crossing are controlled by the level crossing control system which
will be activated (turn on) with the approach of a train to the level crossing. When the level crossing
control system is activated, it carries out a sequence of actions at a specific timing to ensure a safely
closing of the crossing and the danger zone to be free of road traffic. First, the yellow light is switched
on, then after 3 seconds it is switched off and the red light is switched on. After 9 seconds the barriers are
started to be lowered within a maximum time of 6 seconds. If the barriers have been completely lowered
within this time, the level crossing control system signals the safe state of the level crossing and the train
can cross it. When the train has completely passed the danger zone, the level crossing may be opened
for road traffic. In the level crossing opening phase, the barriers are first opened then the red traffic light
and the level crossing control system are switched off.
The half barriers are used to block the entry lane on either side of the level crossing. As there are no
barriers for the exit lanes, imprudent road users may enter the crossing area on the opposite lane if the
closure time of the level crossing exceeds 240 seconds. A general view of the normal operating of the
level crossing control system is given in Figure 2b. The train is equipped on board by a route map which
contains the positions of danger points at level crossings and provides information for the train (lineside
equipment or signal staff) when or where to send an activation order to the corresponding level crossing
control system. The train on-board system sends so a radio message to the level crossing control system
in order to close the level crossing in time and let the train pass through without any delay or braking
action. It will also set a breaking curve for speed supervision making the train stop at the danger point
in a failure situation. The level crossing control system acknowledges receipt of the activation order to
the train. After receipt of the acknowledgement the on-board system waits the necessary time for the
closing of the level crossing, then sends a status request to the level crossing control system. If the level
crossing is in a safe state it will be reported to the train which allows cancelling the breaking curve and
safely pass over the level crossing. The vehicle sensor at the rear of the level crossing will be triggered
allowing the opening of the level crossing.
3.3 Possible Failures
A main cause of failures is the malfunctioning of sensors or actuators. The main physical structures,
communication systems and the control systems themselves may be failed. Failure may occur at any
time. Defective devices will be repaired after some time but will not take place when a train approaching
or passing the level crossing in case of non recoverable failure. In this case study, only a limited number
of failures are taken into account:
256 Malika Medjoudj, Pascal Yim
• Failure of the yellow or the red traffic light
• Failure of barriers (actuators)
• Failure of vehicle sensor
• The delay or loss of telegrams on the radio network
The traffic lights and the vehicle sensor are constantly supervised and defect is immediately reported to
the level crossing control system. Failure of the barriers can only be detected by time-out when barriers
fail to reach upper or lower end position in time or at all.
3.4 Behaviour of the control system under failure
The level crossing control system detects the occurrence and repair of failures of traffic lights and
vehicle sensor and immediately reports them as an event to the operations centre. Train operation is not
suspended on the affected track section until repair.
When the train sends a status request, if in the sequel it does not receive the status report with the safe
state of the level crossing before entering its breaking curve the on-board system will apply the breaks
until the status report will be received or the train has come to a stand still. If the status report is received
before stand still, breaks are released and train can continue its run. If not a request is prompted on the
driver’s display to make sure that the level crossing can be passed safely and to confirm the safe state
on the display. If meanwhile the status has been received the message is cancelled from the display, the
break are released and the driver does not need to confirm anymore. Otherwise the driver has to confirm
the safe state of the level crossing in order to release the breaks and continue its run.
The train supervises a maximum arrival time of 240 seconds to avoid long waiting times of road
users. If the train detects that it cannot arrive at the level crossing within a specified time and still is
able to stop before the danger point it cancels the activation order by sending a deactivated order to the
level crossing. In this situation the train discards any information received from the level crossing and
supervises a breaking curve ending at the danger point. The level crossing will be opened upon receipt
of the deactivation order. The driver has to confirm as described above the safe state before passing
unclosed level crossing.
The level crossing control system will not be activated if the red traffic lights or the vehicle sensor
are defective and it will not send an acknowledgment to the train. If the level crossing control system
has been activated, a minimum green time is considered since the last deactivation of the level crossing
before switching on the yellow light for 3 seconds. If the yellow traffic light becomes defective either
before or during the yellow light period, the traffic lights are switched to red and the red light period of
9 seconds is extended correspondingly by the messing time of the yellow light period. If the red traffic
light fails after activation of the level crossing control the closing procedure has to be cancelled unless
the barriers have yet begun to be lowered. The failure state of the level crossing must be reported if the
barriers fail to be completely lowered within a maximum duration of 6 seconds or if in the meantime the
red traffic light has become defective. The current status of the level crossing will be reported to the train
upon request.
If the vehicle sensor becomes defective the level crossing control system can not be deactivated
anymore by passing train. Consequently the barriers remain lowered and the red traffic light remains
switched on. However, the level crossing control system supervises a maximum closure time starting
from the red light be switched on. The exceeding of the maximum closure time will be reported to the
operation centre by the level crossing control system. The operation centre finds out, whether the train
has yet passed the level crossing or not. In the first case, the operations centre sends a deactivation order
to the level crossing. Otherwise the train is still approaching or just running on the level crossing and the
rules for late arrival at the level crossing apply as described above.
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3.5 Feared events
There are many feared events in the system, but we will interest only to the catastrophic one: the
collision, it means the presence of a train and a road user in the danger zone at the same time.
4 Modelling
Petri nets have been used with success as a formal model for traffic signal control [11], urban traffic
control [12], and level crossing control system [13] aiming security.
This section deals with the modeling of the level crossing control system by a t-time Petri net model
(temporal intervals associated to transitions). Although the appropriate abstraction of certain dynamics
of the system is a pt-arc-time Petri net (temporal intervals associated to arcs related places to transitions)
or a P-time Petri net (temporal intervals associated to places) we have chosen the t-time Petri net model
as the principal of the ESA-PetriNet tool is based on the priority of firing of conflictive transitions.
4.1 General view
In the general view given in Figure 3a, msgi represent radio messages. The message msg1 is sent by
the train to the lccs to switch on when the on-board system detects the approaching of a level crossing.
The message msg2 represents the receipt acknowledgement of the activation order. The message msg3
corresponds to the status request of the level crossing and the message msg4 represents the safe state of
the level crossing reported to the train.
Note that, transmission times on the radio network may vary and messages may be lost as repre-
sented in Figure 3b. The radio message is represented by the place msgi. The time interval [dmi, dMi]
associated to the out put transition of place msgi means that the transmission time may vary between the
minimal value dmi and the maximum one dMi. According to the radio message and the crossing state,
the train will pass with out braking, with braking, come to a stand still or stop.
The dely1 corresponds to the maximum closure time of 240 seconds supervised by the level crossing
control system starting from the red lights be switched on. Crossing the danger zone by the train and the
road user are respectively represented by dz1 and dz2. The message msg7 corresponds to the deactivation
order of the opening of the level crossing sent by the train when it detects that it can not arrive at the level
crossing within the maximum supervised arrival time of 240 seconds.
In this paper, we will interest to the feared scenario corresponding to the presence of a train and a
road user in the danger zone at the same time (collision). This is represented by the Petri net model
of the Figure 3c, where the transition E_fail representing the feared event can be fired only when both
places dz1 (presence of a train in the danger zone) and dz2 (presence of a road user in the danger zone)
are marked. Place S_fail represents the feared state (collision).
Figure 4 represents a general view of different radio messages exchanged between the on-board
system and the level crossing control system. To simplify the case study, we have not presented the radio
messages exchanged with the operations centre like the failure and repair of different devices.
4.2 Petri net model of the level crossing control system
A detailed view of the lccs is given in Figure 5. Note that messages msg1 and msg2 are the same as
in Figure 3. Places lccs_off and lccs_on1 correspond respectively to the deactivation and activation mode
of the level crossing control system. Transition on1 will be fired after reception of the activation order
msg1, to switch to the activated mode if the vehicle sensor (place s3_ok) and the red traffic light (place
red_off ) are not defective. The level crossing control system will be deactivated if the place lccs_on2 or
lccs_on3 is marked. Place lccs_on2 will be marked when the barriers are opened after closure. Place
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Figure 3: General view of the model
Figure 4: General view of radio messages exchanges
lccs_on3 corresponds to the cancelling of the closing procedure if the red traffic light fails after the
activation of the level crossing control system. The green time passed since the last deactivation of the
level crossing will be described in section 4.7
Figure 5: Petri net model of the level crossing control system
4.3 Petri net model of the yellow light
Place yell_off1 in Figure 6a represents the mode off of the yellow light. It will be switched to the acti-
vated mode (place yell_on) when the level crossing is activated (place lccs_on1 marked). After 3 seconds
of the activation of the yellow light, it will be deactivated (marking of places yell_off1 and yell_off2). The
yellow light can fail in the deactivated mode (yell_ko1) or in the activated mode (yell_ko2). Figure 6b
represents the Petri net model of failure and repair of the devices that may be faired in the system (traffic
lights, vehicle sensor and barriers). Failure and repair are represented respectively by the stochastic tran-
sition faili and repi. While failure may occur at any time, repair will not take place when there is a train
approaching or passing the level crossing. This is represented by the minimal value of reparation dri.
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Figure 6: Petri net model of the yellow light
4.4 Petri net model of the red light
The model is similar to the yellow light. The red traffic light can be in mode off (place red_off ), mode
on (place red_on), fail before activation (place red_ko1) or after activation (place red_ko2). We note three
cases of the activation mode of the red light represented in Figure 7 according to the time activation of
the yellow light. In case (a), the yellow light was activated for 3 seconds before the lights traffic switch to
the red. In this case the place yell_off2 is marked and transition on3 can be fired to switch to the activated
mode of the red traffic for 9 seconds. This delay is represented by the time interval [9, 9] related to
the transition cls1 that corresponds to the order of lowering barriers. The place dely1 is the same as
described in Figure 4. The red traffic light can be deactivated when the barrier will be completely opened
represented by the place br4. Place lccs_on2 is the same as described in Figure 5. In case of Figure 7b,
the yellow traffic light becomes defective before the yellow light period (place yell_ko1). In this case
the red traffic light period of 9 seconds is extended to 12 seconds to take into account the yellow light
period. This is represented by the time interval [12, 12] attached to the transition cls2 that corresponds
to the order of lowering barriers. In case (c), the yellow traffic light becomes defective during the yellow
light period (place yell_ko2). In this case, the red light period of 9 seconds is extended correspondingly
to the missing time of the yellow light period. This is represented by the time interval ]9, 12[ associated
to the transition cls3. Transitions and places concerning the barriers will be described in section 4.6.
Figure 7: Petri net model of the red light
4.5 Petri net model of sensors
The system contains three sensors (si): a sensor for the barriers loading, a sensor for the barriers
closing and a vehicle sensor. The Petri net model of a sensor si is similar to the model given in Figure
6b. As described in this figure, a sensor si can be defective and repaired by firing transition repi.
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Figure 8: Petri net model of barriers closing and cancelling of the closing
4.6 Petri net model of barriers (actuators)
Closing
To simplify the Petri net model, we assume that Figure 8a represents the closing of the two half
barriers which are actuated by an actuator for opening (place act1_ok). Note that places dely2, dely3
and dely4 are the same as in Figure 7. The place br1 represents the continuous dynamic of the closing
barriers. Its temporal abstraction is represented by the temporal interval [1, 6] attached to the transition
cls4 as the maximum closure time is 6 seconds and we suppose that the minimum closure duration is 1
second. If the opening actuator fails before the barriers have completely closed (act1_ko marked), the
immediate transition fail8 will be fired and the dynamic of place br1 will be interrupted. This corresponds
to the blocking of the barriers in opening represented by the marking of the place bck1. If the sensor that
detects that the door is closed is defective (marking of place s1_ko), the transition cls4 can not be fired
and the level crossing is considered in a failure state. This is represented by the firing of transition fail14
in the temporal interval ]6, 6+].
Figure 8b represents the cancelling of the closing procedure if the red traffic light fails after the
activation of the level crossing control system before the barriers begun to be lowered. This is represented
by firing the immediate transitions fail10, fail11 or fail12 according to the activation mode of the red light
represented in Figure 7. Place lccs_on3 corresponding to the order of deactivation of the level crossing
will be marked.
Opening
The Petri net model is similar to the Petri net model of closing. The dynamic of the barriers opening
is determined by the position of the actuator for opening (place act2_ok). The dynamic of the opening is
represented by the temporal interval [1, 6]. This dynamic can be interrupted if the actuator fails before
the end of the opening procedure. In this case the immediate transition fail9 will be fired and the place
bck2 corresponding to blocking on opening will be marked. If the sensor of opening is defected (place
s2_ko marked) the transition fail15 will be fired after 6 seconds. We note four cases for barriers opening
represented in Figure 9. Case (a) corresponds to the nominal behaviour. In this case, the vehicle sensor
is not defective (place s3_ok) and the train has completely passed the danger zone in time (marking of
the place trn12 as it will be detailed in section 4.7). The maximum closure time is represented by the
temporal interval [0, 240] associated to the transition opn1. In case (c), the train detects that it can not
arrive to the level crossing in time and it sends a deactivation order to open the level crossing. This is
represented by the message msg7. In case (b) and (d) the vehicle sensor is defective and the level crossing
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Figure 9: Petri net model of the barriers opening
can not be opened by passing of the train. In this case, the exceeding of the maximum closure time is
reported to the operations centre that finds out wither the train has passed the level crossing or is still
approaching. Accordingly the operations centre sends a deactivation order (b) in the first case and (d) in
the second case.
4.7 Petri net model of the train
Nominal operating and late arrival
The detailed Petri net model of the train is given in Figure 10. Place trn1 (Figure 10a) corresponds
to the approaching of the train a level crossing. When the train on-board system detects this approaching,
it sends a radio message msg1 to the level crossing control system to switch on by firing the transition
tr1. Place bc represents the setting of a breaking curve for speed supervision to make the train stop at
the potential danger point in a failure situation. After receipt of the acknowledgement (place msg2), the
on-board system waits an appropriate time (18 seconds) for the level crossing to be closed and sends
the statute request (place msg3) to the level crossing control system. The level crossing is reported to
the train to be in a safe state (place msg4) if the barriers are completely lowered (place br2) and the red
traffic light is in the activated mode (place red_on). After reception of the safe state of the level crossing,
the train cancels the breaking curve (place bc) and passes the level crossing with out braking. This is
represented by firing transitions tdz1 and tr6. The continuous dynamic of the train is represented by
the temporal interval [dti, dTi] attached to transitions tri and tdz1. This means that the tokens has to
remain in the input places of this transitions at least dti and at most dTi. Place trn7 and trn12 represent
the train out of the danger zone. Transition tr7 can be fired after a green time duration dg to specify a
non-finite behaviour of the track. Transition tr14 is fired if the train detects that it can not arrive at the
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Figure 10: Petri net model of the train
level crossing within the maximum supervised arrival time of 240 seconds (late arrival) and still is able to
stop before the danger point. It sends a deactivation order to the level crossing (place msg7) and discards
any information received so far from the level crossing and supervises a breaking curve (firing transition
tr15 after a green time duration dg).
Braking and stand still or stop
Figure 10b represents the case in which the train does not receive the status report with the safe state
of the level crossing before entering its breaking curve. Note that places trn4, bc, msg4, red_on, br2,
trn6, trn12, dz1, msg7 and trn11 are the same as in Figure 10a. The temporal interval ]dMi, dMi+]
represents the fact that the train does not receive the status report before entering its breaking curve. In
this case the on-board system apply the breaks (place trn8) until the status report will be received. The
transition tr9 will be fired to release the breaks and continue the run if the status report is received before
a stand still (place trn9). Place trn10 represents the request prompted on the driver’s display to make sure
that the level crossing can be passed safely. Transition tr11 is fired if meanwhile the status report has
been received. Otherwise transition tr12 will be fired to confirm the safe state by sending the message
msg5. If the level crossing is in its safe state the transition (place msg6), the transition tr13 will be fired
otherwise the train will stop (place trn14).
4.8 Petri net model of the road user
Places road_user and dz2 in Figure 11 represent respectively the road user in the entrance of the
danger zone and crossing the danger zone. The road user may pass the level crossing only if the red
traffic light is not in its activated mode (place red_on is not marked) or the level crossing is still open. It
means that road users may pass when the red traffic light is off (place red_off ) or in its defective mode
(place red_ko1 or red_ko2) even if the half barriers are lowered as they can pass in the opposite lane or
when the half barriers are not yet lowered (place dely2, dely3 or dely4 marked). To simplify, note that we
are focussing on the red traffic light as the yellow traffic light is included in this cases: the yellow traffic
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light can be activated when the red traffic light is in its deativated mode or defected before activation
(red_ko1). the failure of the yellow light is also taken into account as in this case place dely3 or dely4
will be marked. The transition usr represents the non-finite behaviour of the road users.
Figure 11: Petri net model of the road user
4.9 The whole Petri net model of the system
Places labelled with "N" in Figure 12, modelling the whole system, represent normal operating and
transitions labelled with "F" will be added to forbidden transitions and can not be fired. This transitions
concern repair and non-finite behaviour as repair of defective devices will not take place when there is a
train approaching or passing the level crossing and we are interesting in this paper only to one round.
We will seek the feared scenarios corresponding to the presence of both train and road user in the
danger zone, i.e. all the scenarios which lead to the marking of the place S_fail.
5 Extraction of feared scenarios
A general view of ESA_PetriNet and TINA tools is given in Figure 13. To use ESA_PetriNet, we
first edit the Petri net model of the system on the graphic editor of TINA tool to generate two input files:
a descriptive file of the Petri net model and a file containing the invariant of places. Generated scenarios
can be illustrated in the form of a precedence graph. ESA_PetriNet generates a total of 196 scenarios
(nominal and feared) in which 88 are feared. Note that the actual version of ESA_PetriNet generates
non minimal scenarios, so most of the generated scenarios are redundant. This explains the important
number of the scenarios generated. Note also that this version of ESA_PetriNet support continuous
dynamics and temporal constraints and an important number of incoherent scenarios are yet eliminated.
We have chosen these parameters: dmi = 0, dMi = 4, dti = 1, dTi = dg = 10, dri= 250
The 88 feared scenarios (collision) correspond to the following situations:
1) Crossing of both the road user (tdz4) and the train (tdz1) the danger zone when the red traffic
light fails after activation (fail4). In this case, just after the train has received the safe state of the level
crossing, the red traffic light fails and the road user passes at the same time the danger zone thinking
that the train has already passed. We note three categories of scenarios according to the way of the train
crossing.
• The train is crossing without braking: sc10, sc13, sc19, sc22, sc16, sc25, sc30, sc33, sc36, sc41,
sc46, sc53, sc61, sc65, sc69, sc76, sc80, sc84, sc91, sc95, sc102, sc108, sc112, sc116, sc123,
sc127, sc131, sc138, sc142, sc149. These scenarios are represented by sc1a: {tr4, tr5, tdz1, fail4,
tdz4, E_fail}.
• The train is crossing with braking before stand still: sc50, sc57, sc62, sc66, sc73, sc77, sc81, sc88,
sc92, sc99, sc104, sc109, sc113, sc120, sc124, sc128, sc135, sc139, sc146, sc154, sc157, sc162,
sc165, sc168, sc173, sc176, sc181. These scenarios are represented by sc1b: {tr8, tr9, tdz1, fail4,
tdz4, E_fail}.



































































































































































Figure 12: Whole Petri net model of the system
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Figure 13: Screen shots of TINA and ESA_PetriNet tools
• The train is crossing after stand still: sc54, sc71, sc86, sc172, sc180, sc161, sc97, sc118, sc133,
sc144. These scenarios are represented by sc1c: {lost4, tr13, tdz1, fail4, tdz4, E_fail}.
The precedence graph of these three scenarios is given in Figure 14. Ii and Fi represent respectively
initial and final events.
Figure 14: Precedence graph of the scenarios
2) Crossing of the road user the danger zone before the barriers to be lowered (tdz5, tdz6 or tdz7)
then, crossing of the train (tdz1). In this situation, the road user may be slow down stopped or break
down on the danger zone. What often arrives on this zone, in general difficult to cross compared to the
normal road as attested by the statistics of this field. We note three categories of scenarios according to
the mode of activation of the red traffic light and each category contain deferent scenarios according to
the way of train crossing.
• In the case of the activation of the red traffic light after the yellow light period (place dely2 marked),
we find the scenario sc21a: {tr4, tr5, tdz5, tdz1, E_fail}, sc21b: {tdz5, tr8, tr9, tdz1, E_fail} and
sc21c: {lost4, tr13, tdz5, tdz1, E_fail}. The scenario sc21a corresponding to the crossing of the
train without braking regroups scenarios sc3, sc5 and sc11. The scenario sc21b corresponding to
the crossing of the train with braking before stand still regroups scenarios sc23, sc28, and sc44.
The scenario sc21c representing to the crossing of the train after stand still corresponds to the
scenario sc37.
• In the case of the activation of the red traffic light after the yellow traffic light become defective in
its activated mode (place dely4 marked), we find the scenario sc22a: {tr4, tr5, tdz6, tdz1, E_fail},
sc22b: {tdz6, tr8, tr9, tdz1, E_fail} and sc22c: {lost4, tr13, tdz6, tdz1, E_fail}. The scenario
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sc22a corresponding to the crossing of the train without braking regroups the scenarios sc1, sc2
and sc7. The scenario sc22b corresponding to the crossing of the train with braking before stand
still regroups the scenario sc17, sc20 and sc34.The scenarios sc22c representing the crossing of
the train after stand still corresponds to the scenario sc26.
• In the case of the activation of the red traffic light when the traffic light become defective in its
deactivated mode (place dely3 marked), we find the scenario sc23a: {tr4, tr5, tdz7, dz1, E_fail},
sc23b: {tdz7, tr8, tr9, tdz1, E_fail} and sc23c: {lost4, tr13, tdz7, tdz1, E_fail}. The scenario
sc23a corresponding to the crossing of the train without braking regroups the scenarios sc6, sc9
and sc14. The scenario sc23b corresponding to the crossing of the train with braking before stand
still regroups the scenario sc31, sc39 and sc51.The scenarios sc23c representing the crossing of
the train after stand still corresponds to the scenario sc47.
To facilitate the identification of the feared scenarios among the scenarios of normal operating,
ESA_PetriNet tool illustrates them with a different colour.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Two objectives have been reached in this paper. The first is a whole modelling of the level crossing
by a temporal Petri net model. The second is the extraction of the critical scenarios using ESA_PetriNet
tool. The analysis of these scenarios permitted to propose a solution to improve the safety of the level
crossing. This simplest solution consists on the importance of adding a sensor to allow the detection of
road users by the train in the danger zone. Among the perspectives of this work: the quantification of
these scenarios by a Monte Carlo simulation [1] that has been implemented in ESA_PetriNet, checking
different temporal constraints and taking into account the minimality of the scenarios to eliminate the
unnecessary events and the redundancies. These analyses can be extended to a level crossing used in the
intersection area between a multiple track railway line and a road.
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